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Dysfunctional Distinctions in Land Use: The Failure 
of Legislative/Adjudicative Distinctions in Utah and 
the Case for a Uniform Standard of Review 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the late 1990s, the City of Payson, Utah, received several 
applications to rezone portions of the west side of the interstate 
corridor to accommodate medium-density and high-density housing1 
in accordance with Payson City’s comprehensive plan2—a plan that 
outlines the general goals and vision of the city’s future 
development.3 Payson City denied the applications without 
providing any basis justifying its decision.4 The landowners involved 
in both proceedings filed suit against Payson City, and the trial court 
reversed Payson City’s decision because it had “no evidentiary 
support other than popular opinion.”5 On appeal, the court of 
appeals held that no factual basis or evidence supporting the city’s 
 1. One of the applications proposed that the zoning ordinance for several pieces of 
property be amended changing them from an R-1-A zone (low-density residential and 
agricultural use) to an R-1-9 zone (medium-density residential). Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 
17 P.3d 1160, 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), vacated by 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003). The other 
suggested a zoning change from R-1-A (low-density residential and agricultural use) to R-2-75 
(high-density, multifamily residential) on another set of properties. Id. at 1162. 
 2. Id. at 1162 (noting that the City’s comprehensive plan specifically encouraged a 
“mixture of residential densities, including low, medium, and high density housing”); but see 
id. (“The General Plan for Payson City identifies mostly residential land use east of I-15 and 
industrial and agricultural property west of I-15.”). 
 3. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 4. While the City Council made no record of the reasoning for their decisions, popular 
opposition to the applications was expressed at both public hearings. During one of the public 
hearings, “neighboring businesses expressed concern that the existing industrial use of 
neighboring property would be incompatible with a change to higher density residential 
zoning.” Bradley, 17 P.3d at 1163. Specifically, neighboring businesses “feared that new 
residents would seek action to prevent its trucks from operating twenty-four hours a day.” Id. 
The Payson City Planning Commission received a petition signed by thirty-eight property 
owners in the area opposing the other proposal. Id. at 1162. Opponents to the proposal 
expressed concern over “maintaining the agricultural nature of the area . . . and also concerns 
over infrastructure” including traffic. Id. Advocates “expressed the need the area had for low 
income housing.” Id. 
 5. Id. at 1163. 
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denial of the rezoning petition was required because as a legislative 
proceeding, the decision need only be reasonably debatable.6 
While the character of the hearings was not in dispute, the 
legislative nature of the public hearings was less than obvious. The 
Payson City Council basically heard arguments from two groups of 
people: those whose properties would be affected negatively by the 
zoning change and those whose property would be affected 
positively. At heart, the city council made an adjudication of 
individual property owners’ rights and bowed to popular opinion. 
Such a decision completely ignored the important principles of 
effective planning and the due process rights of property owners. 
Although zoning amendments have many characteristics that 
reflect adjudicative rather than legislative decision-making, most 
courts view such city council decisions as legislative actions requiring 
great deference.7 Such light judicial review allows municipalities to 
sacrifice the due process and property rights of certain individuals to 
the private interests of other individuals under the guise of public 
interest and legislative power.8 It also leads to poor planning, leaving 
cities with a mess of ad hoc zoning based on individual developer 
petitions and plans.9 
Since land use regulation first became a cognizable form of state 
police power in the early part of the last century,10 the judiciary has 
reviewed local land use decisions11 in order to ensure compliance 
with state statutes, due process, and property rights. In reviewing 
 6. Id. at 1165. Traditionally, Utah courts had reviewed land use decisions based on 
one of two standards. Courts applied a substantial evidence standard for decisions deemed to 
be administrative or adjudicative and a reasonably debatable standard for those decisions 
deemed to be legislative. See infra Part III.A. 
 7. See, e.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 568–69 (Cal. 1980); 
Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Tri-State 
Generation & Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, 647 P.2d 670, 677 (Colo. 1982); 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
 8. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 841–42 (1983) (noting many scholars’ concern over 
whether “the traditional legislative reasonableness standard is inadequate to assure fairness and 
due consideration” in small zoning changes). 
 9. Id. at 841. 
 10. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–91 (1926). 
 11. This Comment refers to decisions involving zoning, variances, conditional use 
permits, and special use permits, and other similar decisions as “land use decisions.” The term 
“land use decisions,” as used herein, does not include general community or comprehensive 
plans. 
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these decisions, courts became aware of the importance of 
maintaining legislative deference without compromising adjudicative 
legitimacy. In striking this balance, courts have created a maze of 
jurisprudence aimed at developing a system of meaningful review for 
local adjudicative decisions while maintaining deference to legislative 
decisions.12 Recognizing that the difference between legislative and 
adjudicative decisions is subtle, courts have developed two separate 
tests to help determine what category a land use decision falls into. 
Also, many courts have strived to maintain high deference to 
legislative land use decisions,13 while a few courts have restricted 
legislative deference based on a justifiable fear of irrational and 
unsubstantiated local land use decisions that are heavily influenced 
by particular groups or constituencies and rarely promote the central 
goals of community planning.14 
While partially based on practical concerns, the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction is also based upon the principled 
separation of powers doctrine, which mandates that legislative power 
be treated differently from adjudicative power.15 Because separation 
of powers is often strained and vague at the local level,16 some 
scholars have attempted to rework these principles so as to better 
apply them to local government.17 Few scholars, however, have 
 12. Most state courts raise the standard of review when reviewing local government 
adjudicative activities from a “fairly debatable” or “reasonably debatable” legislative standard, 
see, e.g., Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388; Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 704, 709 
(Utah 1943) (“If a [legislative zoning] classification is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of the 
court will not be substituted for the judgment of the city.”) (emphasis added); Harmon City, 
997 P.2d at 324, to a substantial evidence standard, see, e.g., Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984) (holding that the record must indicate a “reasonable basis” 
for the decision); cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1994) (explaining that a 
raised standard of review is appropriate for adjudicative decisions as opposed to legislative ones 
in context of constitutional review of land regulations). 
 13. See, e.g., Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 49 (Utah 2003); Harmon City, 
997 P.2d at 326. 
 14. See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 29–30 (Or. 1973). 
 15. Robert Lincoln, Executive Decisionmaking by Local Legislatures in Florida: Justice, 
Judicial Review and the Need for Legislative Reform, 25 STETSON L. REV. 627, 632 (1996) 
(noting that the distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial authority “is vital for the 
proper determination of the type and scope of judicial review”). 
 16. See, e.g., Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative 
Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 257–66 (2000) (claiming that the 
distinction runs into “practical difficulties” because the local government structure does not fit 
“under strict separation of powers principles”). 
 17. See, e.g., Lincoln, supra note 15, at 647–52 (suggesting basing the distinction on the 
“structure” of the decision making process). 
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examined the possibility of abandoning the distinction and 
developing one standard of review for land use decisions18 and 
limiting pure legislative power in local land use to the development 
of a general or comprehensive plan.19 In 1999, the Utah Supreme 
Court arguably suggested such a standard of review in Springville 
Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville,20 spurring a 
debate in the lower courts.21 Although the Utah Supreme Court 
later clarified that it did not address the single standard issue in 
Springville Citizens because the parties conceded the issue,22 the 
lower court debate not only developed a reasonable statutory 
interpretation favoring a single standard of review but also illustrated 
the many unnecessary problems and complications courts face in 
crafting a rule for distinguishing local legislative action from 
adjudicative action. 
This Comment contends that all Utah land use decisions, 
whether they are adopting or amending zoning ordinances, 
variances, or special use permits, should be reviewed under a uniform 
standard that requires local governments to provide substantial 
evidence in support of their decision. Although the statutory 
arguments will not apply to all states, this Comment also contends 
that every state, whether through the courts or the legislature, 
should consider a uniform standard of review for land use decisions. 
Making the legislative/adjudicative distinction for the purpose of 
reviewing land use decisions has become difficult, unpredictable, and 
unwieldy. However, a single standard of review can resolve the 
current difficulties and still strike the proper balance between 
legislative deference, effective planning, and due process. This single 
standard should apply to all routine land use decisions with the 
exception of the development of a comprehensive general plan. 
Specifically, courts should apply a standard of review that determines 
 18. See Rose, supra note 8, at 846 (explaining that “piecemeal local land decisions 
should not be classed as either ‘legislative’ or ‘judicial’”). 
 19. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 20. 979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999); but see Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 
54 (2003) (holding that Springville Citizens did not suggest a single standard of review). For 
an explanation of how Springville Citizens arguably suggests a single standard of review, see 
Part III. 
 21. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 17 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 
vacated by 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003); Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321, 326 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
 22. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 54 (Utah 2003). 
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whether land use decisions comply with the mandates of the 
municipality’s comprehensive plan. The standard should resemble 
the substantial evidence standard traditionally used to review 
adjudicative decisions. If courts require municipalities to use their 
comprehensive plans in making land use decisions, municipalities are 
more likely to make effective planning decisions and avoid irrational, 
ad hoc decisions based on immediate public opinion. 
In making these contentions, this Comment will focus on Utah’s 
statutory construction and case law and examine the policies behind 
the legislative/adjudicative distinction. Part II of this Comment will 
outline the basic zoning processes and analyze the traditional 
methods for distinguishing between legislative and adjudicative land 
use decisions for the purposes of judicial review. Part III will present 
Utah land use law, the confusing nature of the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction in Utah, and the debate over a 
uniform standard of review. Part IV will further explain the policy 
behind setting a uniform standard of review for land use decisions, 
including the problems the traditional tests have in distinguishing 
between local legislative and adjudicative actions and the application 
of traditional notions of separation of powers and delegation to state 
and local government schemes. Part V will conclude that a single 
standard of review for land use decisions—whether adopting or 
amending a zoning ordinance23 or granting special use permits and 
variances24—will create a clearer line between local legislative and 
adjudicative power, promote more meaningful planning processes, 
protect individual property and due process rights, and better 
account for the nature of local government.25 
II. BACKGROUND: THE BASICS OF ZONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Understanding the problems courts have faced in developing 
proper standards of review for local land use decisions requires a 
basic understanding of the zoning and land use system developed in 
the United States, including the basic provisions of state legislation 
 23. See infra Part II.A.1-2. 
 24. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 25. Before proceeding, note that the terms administrative and adjudicative have slightly 
different meanings in that some administrative activities are not adjudicative, such as 
rulemaking. Courts, however, often use the terms synonymously. This Comment will generally 
use the term adjudicative because it more precisely defines the issue; however, there will be no 
attempt to change the terminology of the cases cited herein. 
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that grant local government zoning power, the general form of 
zoning ordinances, the typical proceedings and actions used in local 
land use planning, and the development of a legislative/adjudicative 
distinction for determining the level of judicial review for land use 
decisions. The central piece in this is a state’s enabling legislation 
that authorizes local governments to develop local land use laws. 
Most states have at one time or other another adopted the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA or the Act)—a uniform act 
developed by the Department of Commerce.26 All of the basic land 
use concepts including zoning ordinances, other land use controls, 
and judicial review hinge on the application of state enabling 
legislation that has, for the most part, mirrored the SZEA in some 
form or other. 
A. The SZEA: A Typical Model for State Enabling Legislation 
The SZEA grants broad powers to municipalities such as cities, 
counties, and other local authorities to develop land use regulations 
“[f]or the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the 
general welfare of the community”27 and to deal with a variety of 
specifically enumerated community planning problems.28 
 26. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926), reprinted in DAVID L. CALLIES 
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 36–39 (3d ed. 1999). The SZEA has been the 
model for state zoning enabling legislation for nearly a century. The United States Department 
of Commerce issued an initial draft of the SZEA in 1922, and four years later, nineteen states 
had used it to draft their own statutes. 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW 
OF ZONING § 2.21 (4th ed. 1996). Eventually, the act was adopted by all fifty states; it is still 
in effect, with some variation, in forty-seven states. 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS JR. & JOHN M. 
TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 19:1 (2003).  
 27. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 1; see, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-9-102 (2003). The Act specifically grants municipalities power:  
to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and other 
structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and 
other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, 
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes[;] 
  . . . [and to] divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape, and 
area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act.  
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, §§ 1–2. 
 28. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 3. Specifically, section 
3 suggests that the regulations and restrictions should be designed to lessen congestion in the 
streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general 
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue 
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, 
sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. Id. The regulations should also “be 
made with reasonable consideration . . . to the character of the district . . . with a view to 
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The Act creates two distinct methods for meeting its broad goals. 
First, it gives local legislative bodies power to adopt a zoning 
ordinance.29 The typical zoning ordinance generally contains textual 
definitions and land use regulations accompanied by a map of the 
municipality specifying how those definitions apply to individual 
districts.30 The map divides the municipality into various districts 
usually consisting of residential, commercial, and industrial areas.31 
The text includes standards and regulations for each district, 
administrative provisions, and procedures for amending the 
ordinance and granting exceptions.32 
Second, The Act requires the municipalities to appoint a board 
of adjustments in order to “make special exceptions to . . . the 
[zoning] ordinance in harmony with its general purpose and 
intent . . . in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions 
and safeguards.”33 The special exceptions a board of adjustments may 
grant include variances, special use permits, conditional use permits, 
or nonconformities, all of which have slightly different purposes but 
are generally granted under similar adjudicative processes.34 
From the power granted under state enabling statutes modeled 
after the SZEA, local governments make three types of land use 
decisions: decisions made by the legislative body to adopt a zoning 
ordinance; decisions by the legislative body to amend the zoning 
ordinance; and decisions by the board of adjustment (which is 
sometimes also the legislative body acting in a different capacity) to 
grant variations from the ordinance in the form of variances, special 
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land 
throughout [the] municipality.” Id. The Utah Code contains similar language. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-9-102. 
 29. The Act allows local governments to “provide for the manner in which regulations 
and restrictions and the boundaries of such districts shall be determined, established, and 
enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or changed” except that regulations 
shall only be effective “after a public hearing.” STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, 
supra note 26, § 4. Utah includes similar language in its statement of purpose, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 10-9-102 (2003), and incorporates it into the actual grant of power by authorizing 
municipalities to “enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use and 
development that furthers the intent of this chapter.” Id. § 10-9-401. 
 30. CALLIES, supra note 26, at 39. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 7; see, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407, -701 to -708. 
 34. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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use permits, or conditional use permits. Local governments have also 
developed innovative land use schemes that integrate these types of 
decisions. 
1. Adopting the zoning ordinance 
There are two steps to adopting a zoning ordinance under the 
SZEA. First, an appointed zoning commission issues a preliminary 
plan “recommend[ing] the boundaries of the various original 
districts and appropriate regulations to be enforced,” holds public 
hearings on that plan, and issues a final report that includes a 
recommendation for the plan’s adoption as a zoning ordinance to 
the local legislative body.35 Second, the legislative body holds its own 
public hearings and then makes a final decision to adopt or reject the 
plan.36 
2. Amending the zoning ordinance 
The SZEA treats amendments of zoning ordinances in a manner 
similar to the adoption of a zoning ordinance except that the 
standard act does expressly request that local governments develop 
specific procedures for amending a zoning ordinance.37 However, 
there are two practical distinctions between an amendment and the 
adoption of an ordinance. First, amendments sometimes are very 
small and often seem more like variances and special or conditional 
use permits. Second, states often develop innovative methods for 
amending the zoning map. An example of a commonly used zoning 
amendment scheme is the floating zone.38 The floating zone is a 
method municipalities may use to create mixed use zones for 
purposes such as industrial parks, affordable housing,39 and planned 
unit developments.40 To create a floating zone, the legislative body 
specifically defines a zone for the desired uses but does not place the 
zone on the zoning map until after a developer recommends a 
 35. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, §§ 4, 6. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 4. 
 38. 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, §§ 11.05–.06. 
 39. CALLIES, supra note 26, at 76. 
 40. 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.07. Planned unit developments are a plat of mixed 
uses usually including several residential uses, commercial uses, and open space. See infra Part 
II.A.4. 
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specific location.41 The zone thus “floats” until a developer proposes 
a project that includes the specified uses and recommends a location 
for the project. After it approves the developer’s proposal, the 
legislative body amends the map to permanently fix the proposed 
zone.42 
3. Variances and special or conditional use permits 
Variances and special or conditional use permits are designated 
exceptions to the general zoning standards in a zoning district. They 
are generally used for “problem uses . . . that are difficult to locate 
anywhere of right”43 or uses that are “troublesome even in districts 
where they logically belong”44 Common examples are public utility 
installations, halfway houses, churches, and certain types of 
commercial uses within designated residential zones.45 
The SZEA has a complex set of procedural requirements for 
approving variances and special or conditional use permits. The 
SZEA delegates these decisions to approve such permits to an 
appointed board of adjustments. The process requires appropriate 
standards and safeguards to be set up by the local zoning ordinance, 
mandates the board of adjustments to create a complete record, and 
provides a means of judicial review.46 Municipalities often develop 
their own procedures in addition to those found within their 
enabling act. The criteria for variances and conditional use permits 
are usually part of the zoning ordinance. Municipalities usually 
identify districts where these special and problem uses might be 
acceptable under certain circumstances. 
4. Innovative land use schemes: the planned unit development 
The planned unit development (PUD) is a carefully planned plat 
that mixes multiple uses such as residential and commercial.47 It 
allows local zoning commissions and legislative bodies to review 
developer plans for mixed-use zones. Local governments use two 
 41. 1 WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 26, § 29:1. 
 42. 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.08. 
 43. CALLIES, supra note 26, at 83. 
 44. 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 9.18. 
 45. CALLIES, supra note 26, at 83. 
 46. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 7. 
 47. 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.12. 
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different methods to approve or develop PUDs. Some municipalities 
use the floating zone, which involves designating areas of a zoning 
map in which a PUD might be appropriate and actually mapping the 
zone only after a specific PUD is approved.48 As mentioned above,49 
this procedure is essentially equivalent to a zoning amendment. 
Other municipalities use the variance or special use permit method 
that designates zones where such a use might be permissible under 
certain circumstances and allows developers to apply for special 
permits to develop a PUD within a specified zone.50 
B. Judicial Review of Land Use Decisions 
Because of the differences among each type of land use decision, 
including the various procedural requirements, the number of people 
affected, and the varied statutory purposes, courts have applied 
differing standards of review based on the type of decision being 
reviewed. When challenged, courts review zoning ordinances based 
on their compliance with the enabling statute, which often requires 
compliance with a comprehensive plan,51 their own administrative 
requirements, and whether it is “fairly” or “reasonably” debatable 
that the ordinance meets the purposes of the enabling statute.52 
Courts review variances, special or conditional use permits, and other 
similar decisions based on the procedures and standards provided by 
the zoning ordinance and ensuring that the complete record before 
the board of adjustments offers sufficient or substantial evidence for 
the board’s decision.53 
However, courts have struggled to develop workable standards 
of review for land use decisions that lie between adopting a zoning 
ordinance and creating variances and exceptions to the ordinance: 
 48. Id. §§ 11.15–.17. 
 49. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 50. 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.18. 
 51. Although state enabling statutes vary in some of their specifics, “nearly all states 
require that zoning take place in accordance with [a] comprehensive plan.” Edward J. Sullivan 
& Carrie Richter, Out of the Chaos: Towards a National System of Land-Use Procedures, 34 
URB. LAW. 449, 454 (2002). 
 52. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). The central 
purpose of the SZEA is to “promote health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the 
community.” STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 1; see Marshall v. 
Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 704, 705–06 (Utah 1943) (holding that the zoning ordinance could 
be upheld “if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare”). 
 53. See, e.g., Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1984). 
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zoning amendments. Courts have also been inconsistent in 
encouraging planning that is consistent with a comprehensive plan. 
As this Comment will show, these two issues are correlative. 
1. Standards of review 
State courts have traditionally made distinctions between 
adjudicative and legislative activities for the purpose of reviewing 
local land use decisions. Courts show greater deference to legislative 
proceedings under a “fairly” or “reasonably debatable” standard,54 
and they subject adjudicative proceedings to higher scrutiny under a 
“substantial evidence” standard.55 
The natural division between the way courts treat the review of 
legislative and adjudicative decisions is based on a longstanding 
concern over balancing appropriate legislative deference with 
legitimate adjudicative review. Because most enabling statutes grant 
municipalities a general legislative power to adopt zoning 
ordinances, courts often feel it necessary to give the local legislative 
bodies deference. However, enabling legislation also contains 
procedural safeguards and specifically designated purposes that are 
more characteristic of adjudicative proceedings and give courts an 
opportunity to review proceeding records and apply a more stringent 
standard of review. 
This legislative/adjudicative distinction represents the courts’ 
attempts to balance two opposing policies: due process and 
efficiency. One scholar explained: 
[L]ocal governments and their officials have an interest in 
maintaining a manageable local zoning process which is not so 
cumbersome and time-consuming that it overtaxes the resources 
and capabilities of local decision-making bodies. This interest is of 
special concern to small local governments with limited staffs and 
financial resources. . . . [P]roperty owners and other affected 
 54. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388; Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 
P.2d 321, 324 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); see also Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709 (“If a [legislative 
zoning] classification is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be substituted 
for the judgment of the city.” (emphasis added) (citing Wippler v. Hohn, 110 S.W.2d 409 
(Mo. 1937))). 
 55. See, e.g., Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. 
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 405 (2d ed. 2000); cf. Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1994) (explaining that a raised standard of review is 
appropriate for adjudicative decisions as opposed to legislative ones). 
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citizens have a strong interest in a rational local decision-making 
process that affords fair treatment and due process and produces 
decisions based on previously established policies and standards 
rather than the undue political influence of a particular applicant, 
industry or constituency. On the other hand, these same groups 
have an interest in ensuring that the zoning process does not 
become so judicialized that effective participation requires the 
employment of lawyers and other professionals for even the most 
routine rezoning application.56 
While local governments are always vying for more efficiency, 
property owners and other interested parties are concerned with 
both due process and predictability in order to manage their own 
costs in promoting their interests with respect to land use regulation. 
Traditionally, courts have viewed the distinction along 
adjudicative and legislative lines as furthering these policy concerns. 
Adjudicative proceedings typically have a more complete record,57 
involve preconceived standards and factors for making decisions,58 
and deal more directly with individual petitioner rights allowing 
courts to carefully examine the record and determine the correctness 
of the decision. Legislative actions generally create and develop 
standards based on broad policy concerns and factors that often 
affect broader groups of people making it difficult for courts to 
weigh individual rights or carefully scrutinize the decision based on 
well defined criteria.59 
State courts have developed two competing analyses to 
distinguish legislative activities from adjudicative or quasi-judicial 
 56. Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-Judicial Rezonings: A Commentary on the Snyder 
Decision and the Consistency Requirement, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 243, 278–79 (1994), 
quoted in ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 55, at 405. 
 57. See LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION: PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING PRACTICE 43 
(Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989) (explaining that courts consider whether a 
decision was “based on the record supported by reasons and findings of fact”). 
 58. For example, a board of adjustments only grants variances and special use permits 
when the petitioner meets the specific standards and criteria created by the zoning ordinance. 
See supra Part II.A.2. 
 59. Again, this distinction is heavily concerned with providing due process in individual 
disputes while allowing democracy to work in broader policy implications. See LAND USE AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING PRACTICE, supra note 57, at 40 (“The due 
process clause requires minimal standards of fairness in administrative and quasi-judicial 
decision-making in land use regulation. These procedural requirements of the due process 
clause do not apply to legislative decision-making.”). 
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activities: formal and functional.60 The majority has adopted a formal 
analysis, which bases the distinction between legislative and 
adjudicative on the identity of the decision-making body and the 
type of proceeding, while the minority has adopted a functional 
approach, which bases the distinction on the results of the local 
government action. Under either approach, most courts view the 
adoption of a zoning ordinance as legislative and the granting of 
variances and special permits as adjudicative. The different analyses, 
however, create different and sometimes unpredictable outcomes for 
zoning amendments and other innovative land use schemes, such as 
PUDs. While the formal approach classifies zoning amendments as 
legislative, the functional approach often classifies them as 
adjudicative. Each formulation lends itself more to one of the 
competing policies—efficiency or due process. Formal distinctions 
tend to provide for greater efficiency, while functional distinctions 
are aimed more at due process protections. 
 
a. The formal approach and the case for efficiency. A majority of 
states have adopted a formal approach to the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction.61 The formal approach accords greater deference to local 
land use decisions and promotes efficient use of local government 
resources. Under the formal approach, courts distinguish between 
legislative and adjudicative acts based on the decision-making body62 
or, if necessary, the type of proceeding involved. The adoption or 
amendment of a zoning ordinance is legislative under the formal 
approach because it is an action of the legislative body. Meanwhile, 
the grant of variances and use permits is adjudicative because they are 
acts performed by administrative bodies like a board of adjustments. 
Formalist jurisdictions recognize that many municipal legislative 
bodies often act as the board of adjustments and must broaden their 
analysis to the type of proceeding to determine whether the act is 
 60. Reznik, supra note 16, at 257–58. 
 61. See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (noting that the 
majority of jurisdictions follow the formal approach and find that zoning amendments are 
always legislative acts); Charles L. Siemon & Julie P. Kendig, Judicial Review of Local 
Government Decisions: “Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil,” 20 NOVA L. REV. 707, 
729–30 (1996) (noting that the functional approach was always a minority approach used in 
ten to fifteen jurisdictions at its peak). 
 62. Lincoln, supra note 15, at 645; see Reznik, supra note 16, at 258. 
6PRA-FIN 10/13/2004 7:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2004 
1062 
 
legislative or adjudicative in those cases.63 Ultimately, this approach 
grants more deference to local government decisions because it 
allows local governments to determine whether a particular decision 
is adjudicative or legislative by choosing which process to employ to 
make the decision. 
California zoning law provides an excellent example of the 
formal approach. In Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, the 
California Supreme Court held that zoning amendments were always 
legislative acts, regardless of the “size of parcel affected,” and were 
thus subject to the initiative process.64 Within its discussion, the 
Arnel Development court noted the vast amount of precedent that 
carefully divided legislative and adjudicative acts without regard to 
the size of the area affected.65 The court cited, as an example, Toso v. 
City of Santa Barbara,66 in which a California appellate court 
explained: 
Although, a decision granting a variance, a conditional use permit, 
or an exception to use is an administrative act, a decision on an 
application for rezoning is a legislative act. Rezoning is 
accomplished by amendment of a zoning ordinance and by the 
same procedure as the original enactment, and a city council’s act 
in amending a zoning ordinance to exclude previously included 
property is a legislative and not administrative act.67 
The formal approach looks at the type of proceeding and the 
type of body making the decision rather than at the actual effect of 
the zoning change. 
States that make formal distinctions ignore practical similarities 
between different types of municipal land use actions. For example, 
in Toso, the court determined that the granting of a petition to 
amend the zoning ordinance was a legislative act because it involved 
amending the zoning ordinance and was accomplished by “the same 
procedure as the original enactment” of the zoning ordinance 
regardless of the size of the amendment.68 However, many small 
 63. See Davis County v. Clearfield, 756 P.2d 704, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding a 
city council’s denial of a special use permit, a decision traditionally made by an administrative 
board, must have a “factual basis in the record”). 
 64. 620 P.2d 565, 566–67 (Cal. 1980). 
 65. Id. at 568–70. 
 66. 162 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 67. Id. at 214 (citations omitted). 
 68. Id. 
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zoning amendments have almost no distinction from special use 
permits or variances—traditional adjudicative acts69—at a practical 
level, but, as demonstrated by the California courts, the amendments 
are given deference under the formal approach because they involve 
an amendment to an ordinance enacted by the legislative body. 
There are two advantages underlying the formal method. First, 
the formal approach offers flexibility to local governments in land use 
decisions and keeps the judiciary from getting deeply involved in 
broad policy disputes involving the proper use of land within 
municipalities. Formal lines of distinction enable a local body to 
“choose its poison” in that the body can often accomplish the same 
end through either (1) a variance or special use permit or (2) a 
zoning amendment. While zoning amendments have their limits,70 
local governing bodies maintain a great deal of discretion when 
courts must consider, void of context, whether the decisions satisfy 
the “reasonably debatable” standard. Second, the formal approach 
creates a clear line that makes it easy for judges to determine the 
proper standard of review and allows parties to predict how a court 
will rule. A formal line generally makes it easier for local 
governments to make land use decisions quickly and to avoid the 
costs of creating reasoned decisions and findings for judicial review.71 
While this is efficient for the short term, such decisions often lead to 
inefficient long-term planning. 
 
b. The functional approach and the protection of due process. The 
functional approach distinguishes between legislative and 
adjudicative activities based on the size of the area and the number 
of people immediately affected by the decision rather than the nature 
 69. See CALLIES, supra note 26, at 83–100 (explaining the procedures used for special 
use permits and variances); 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 9.18. 
 70. Even jurisdictions that maintain a formal distinction between legislative and 
adjudicative activities consider some zoning amendments to be impermissible spot zoning. See 
generally 1 WILLIAMS & TAYLOR, supra, note 26, § 28 (explaining the nebulous tests and issues 
surrounding illegal spot zoning and its relation to enforcing the language of enabling statutes). 
 71. In the context of constitutional law, courts have often applied a similar rule in 
making separation of powers determinations based on basically the same policy. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493 (1987) 
(explaining that “[f]ormalist decisions are premised on the beliefs that the text of the 
Constitution and the intent of its drafters are controlling and sometimes dispositive, that 
changed circumstances are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes, and that broader ‘policy’ 
concerns should not play a role in legal decisions” (emphasis added)). 
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of the proceeding or the decision-making body. This approach 
focuses on results rather than procedures. For practical purposes, it 
expands the types of land use decisions subject to the adjudicative 
“substantial evidence” standard of review to the detriment of 
legislative deference, and it most directly affects the classification of 
zoning amendments. 
The functional approach was first developed in Fasano v. Board of 
County Commissioners.72 In Fasano, the Board of County 
Commissioners approved the rezoning of thirty-two acres of land 
from a single-family residential zone to a planned residential zone to 
allow the construction of a mobile home park.73 The Commissioners 
based their approval of the rezoning on a floating zone contained in 
the zoning ordinance that created “a zone classification authorized 
for future use but not placed on the zoning map until its use at a 
particular location [was] approved.”74 While floating zones would be 
considered a legislative act by courts following the formal approach, 
the Fasano court treated it as an adjudicative act by requiring the 
Commission to meet a specified burden of proof. Despite the 
Commission’s statement that the “change allows for ‘increased 
densities and different types of housing to meet the needs of 
urbanization over that allowed by the existing zoning,’”75 the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that the Commission did not meet its 
burden of proof to show that the rezoning was “in conformance 
with the comprehensive plan.”76 
In creating this higher standard of review, the court recognized 
the increased burden on local governments resulting from a less 
flexible zoning process.77 The court, however, explained, “having 
weighed the dangers of making desirable change more difficult 
against the dangers of the almost irresistible pressures that can be 
asserted by private economic interests on local government, we 
believe that the latter dangers are more to be feared.”78 The court 
 72. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). See Rose, supra note 8, at 852–53 (citing Fasano as the 
prime example of the functional approach). 
 73. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 25. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 28. 
 77. Id. at 29 (noting that “by placing the burden of . . . proof upon the [county] . . . , 
we may lay the court open to criticism by legal scholars who think it desirable that planning 
authorities be vested with the ability to adjust more freely”). 
 78. Id. at 30. 
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was concerned that legislative bodies making small zoning 
amendments were actually acting in a judicial capacity by applying 
“‘general rule[s] or polic[ies] to specific individuals, interests, or 
situations.’”79 Because of the adjudicative nature of small zoning 
amendments, the Fasano court felt the formal rule did not draw the 
proper line between local legislative and adjudicative decisions. 
The court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between 
the adoption of ordinances that establish “general policies without 
regard to a specific piece of property” and “a determination [of] 
whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be 
changed.”80 The Fasano court held that this determination must be 
based on the results of the local government’s decision rather than 
on the type of decision-making body. 
Several other courts have adopted similar reasoning. One year 
before Fasano, the Supreme Court of Washington explained: 
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a 
comprehensive plan and zoning code it acts in a policy making 
capacity. But in amending a zoning code, . . . the same body, in 
effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought by the 
proponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning 
change. The parties whose interests are affected are readily 
identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may 
permeate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater 
impact on one group of citizens than on the public generally.81 
The Idaho Supreme Court also declared: “We are persuaded the 
cases which characterize as quasi-judicial the action of a zoning body 
in applying general rules or policies to specific individuals, interests, 
or situations represent the better rule.”82 
 79. Id. at 26–27 (quoting Michael S. Holman, Comment, Zoning Amendments: The 
Product of Judicial or Quasi-judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 137 (1972)). 
 80. Id. at 26. Ironically, this policy is at the heart of all legislative/adjudicative 
distinctions, including the formal approach. The core reason that almost all courts, regardless 
of the approach they use, defer to legislative acts is because legislative bodies generally make 
important broad policy decisions that are inappropriate for courts to make. See supra notes 57–
59 and accompanying text. 
 81. Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972), overruled by Raynes 
v. Leavenworth, 821 P.2d 1204 (Wash. 1992). 
 82. Cooper v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947, 950 (Idaho 1980); see also 
Margolis v. Dist. Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981) (declaring that while zoning was subject 
to the referendum process as a legislative act, zoning amendments were not legislative and thus 
not subject to the referendum process); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 
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These courts recognized the unique nature of zoning 
amendments—they almost always deal with individual pieces of 
property and individual interests. Under a formal approach, decisions 
to amend zoning requirements  are categorized as legislative and 
given broad deference. However, recognizing that due process rights 
were being ignored under the formal approach, many courts decided 
that when laws are applied to individual interests and situations, 
courts should categorize the decisions as adjudicative and raise the 
standard of review in examining the specific evidence on the record. 
Though the approach appears to have such distinct advantages, the 
functional approach proved to be unpopular.83 
 
c. The delegation test: an alternative approach based on separation 
of powers. One scholar has suggested replacing both the formal and 
the functional tests with a delegation test to distinguish between 
legislative and adjudicative acts at the local level.84 Under the 
delegation test, if a land use decision is authorized by an ordinance 
that outlines fixed procedures and standards, then it is an 
adjudicative action.85 If, on the other hand, the decision is based on 
inherent legislative power, i.e., the police power, the decision is 
legislative. This approach is based on the idea that almost all 
administrative activities are delegated from a branch of government 
that constitutionally or inherently has the power to make such 
decisions. Because a local governing body may delegate 
administrative authority to itself, at times it can act as an 
administrative board rather than a legislative body.86 As posed here, 
this test has some similarities with the formal approach because, like 
the formal approach, the delegation test considers the nature of the 
decision-making process and determines whether an ordinance 
requires adherence to fixed procedures or not. However, while the 
(Fla. 1993) (holding that the legislature recognized a need to review zoning amendments 
more like adjudicative proceedings by passing the Growth Management Act); Golden v. City 
of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978). 
 83. Between ten and fifteen states have adopted the Fasano standard. See Siemon & 
Kendig, supra note 61, at 729–30. Eventually, however, the movement faded. Id. Part of the 
reason for this decline might be the unpredictable nature of the test. See infra Part IV.A.2. For 
other rationales behind the wane of the functional approach embodied in Fasano, see Siemon 
& Kendig, supra note 61, at 731–34. 
 84. Lincoln, supra note 15, at 647–50. 
 85. Id. at 649. 
 86. Id. at 648. 
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formal approach first evaluates the decision-making body and only 
evaluates the type of proceeding when necessary, the delegation 
approach focuses primarily on the proceeding. The delegation test 
does properly take into consideration important separation of powers 
principles, but may not take the philosophy far enough.87 
2. The comprehensive plan 
Central to the question of judicial review is the definition of the 
comprehensive plan. There is a strong correlation between the 
method a court uses in determining the standard of review (formal 
or functional), the ultimate standard of review (reasonably debatable 
or substantial evidence), and the weight a court gives the 
comprehensive plan. The comprehensive plan is a type of mythical 
creature; namely, courts have never quite determined exactly what it 
is.88 Ideally, a comprehensive plan would be an independent 
document that defines a community’s large-scale and long-term 
planning and development goals. But, “few states ‘plan’ by means of 
a document labeled the ‘comprehensive plan.’”89 Applying the 
substantial evidence standard tends to emphasize the importance of a 
distinct comprehensive plan. Conversely, applying the reasonably 
debatable standard treats the requirement more casually. 
Over the last three quarters of a century, courts have developed 
three general approaches to defining the comprehensive plan. 
Professor Sullivan describes the three approaches as follows: 
1. The “unitary” view, which considers the zoning map or 
ordinance as the only important document and as the 
“comprehensive plan” . . . ; 
2. The “planning factor” view that a local plan, if it exists, is a 
factor to consider in weighing the validity of a land-use action; or 
 87. See infra Part IV.C. 
 88. Sullivan & Richter, supra note 51, at 453–54 (noting that the term “comprehensive 
plan” was not defined in the SZEA, “and a lack of definition has caused continual confusion 
for local planners and the courts”). 
 89. Id. 
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3. The “planning mandate” view that the local plan is a separate 
and dispositive document weighing the validity of a land-use 
action.90 
The first approach, which the majority of courts have adopted,91 
basically equates the zoning ordinance itself with the comprehensive 
plan.92 Such an approach requires the zoning ordinance, as the only 
physical evidence of a comprehensive plan, to be reasonable, that is, 
“fairly debatable,” and requires the ordinance to cover the entire 
municipality.93 
The second approach applies a list of factors to determine 
whether the ordinance or individual decision fits into the “all-
encompassing” whole.94 On a practical level, however, the approach 
yields similar results to the first approach because the only document 
that courts have to construct factors from is the zoning ordinance. 
The third approach is unique because it requires the municipality 
to create a distinct document with which all other ordinances and 
regulations must accord. The existence of such a document is a 
prerequisite to valid zoning.95 While this approach has recently 
become popular, its popularity is the result of more explicit statutory 
schemes rather than judicial initiative.96 
Because the functional approach expands the use of the 
substantial evidence standard of review, it tends to put greater 
emphasis on the comprehensive plan.97 One scholar has called the 
 90. Edward J. Sullivan, The Evolving Role of the Comprehensive Plan, 32 URB. LAW. 813, 
813 (2000). 
 91. Id. at 815. 
 92. Id. at 814 (explaining that under the “unitary” view, “zoning is planning”). 
 93. Elsewhere, Sullivan has explained that this approach defines “comprehensive in 
terms of addressing an entire geographic area.” Sullivan & Richter, supra note 51, at 453 
(citing Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 
1159 (1955)). 
 94. Id. at 453–54. 
 95. At the time the SZEA was enacted with its comprehensive plan requirement, it was 
“widely assumed” that municipalities would carefully set their goals far in advance and that a 
general plan would be developed. Rose, supra note 8, at 848–49. Courts, however, have 
generally not made the comprehensive plan a prerequisite for valid zoning unless specifically 
required by statute. 1 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 5.04. Yet, the requirement found in most 
statutes that zoning comply with a comprehensive plan would clearly gain more bite if courts 
interpreted it to require a distinct plan as a prerequisite for valid zoning. See infra Part IV.B. 
 96. See 1 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 5.04. 
 97. Cases in which a land use decision is classified as adjudicative rely heavily on a 
comprehensive plan. See, e.g., Cooper v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947, 951–52 
(Idaho 1980) (resolving an issue on rehearing concerning whether to apply the comprehensive 
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trend represented by Fasano “plan jurisprudence”98 because 
classifying more land use decisions as adjudicative increases the 
importance and relevance of the comprehensive plan to a greater 
number of decisions. She also suggests that courts have chosen to 
adopt the Fasano rule not only out of a concern for protecting 
individual property rights, but also because small zoning 
amendments “are hard to control” and courts want to give effect to 
the purposes of the enabling legislation by enforcing “conformity to 
a plan.”99 
This observation recognizes an additional policy concern that the 
Fasano rule addresses: effective, meaningful planning. Municipalities 
whose decisions are reviewed under the reasonably debatable 
standard, which practically ignores the concept of a distinct 
comprehensive plan other than the zoning ordinance itself, often 
engage in “piecemeal” planning that results in “ad hoc responses to 
individual development proposals.”100 Quick responses to immediate 
local concerns tend to ignore regional, long-term planning problems. 
Cognizant planning and public interest also get drowned in the sea 
of local private interests. One scholar explains: 
[T]he arbitrariness standard cannot really control small changes. It 
is too broad to treat seriously the fairness claims of the individual 
property owners with interests at stake in piecemeal changes, and it 
fails to account for the cumulative effect of many nonarbitrary 
decisions that seem to shave away, in salami slices, any larger 
concepts underlying the original, more general land regulations.101 
Courts that use the formal approach restrict the use of the 
substantial evidence standard and apply the reasonably debatable 
standard more often tend to place less weight on the comprehensive 
plan in effect at the time of the original challenge or the current comprehensive plan); Fasano 
v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 28 (Or. 1973) (requiring the county commission to 
prove “that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive plan”); Fleming v. City of 
Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972) (noting that zoning amendments must be in 
accordance with the “comprehensive plan and the zoning code”), overruled in part by Raynes 
v. City of Leavenworth, 821 P.2d 1204 (Wash. 1992). Cases in which the land use decision is 
classified as legislative only occasionally mention a comprehensive plan in passing and do not 
give it much weight. See, e.g., infra note 116 (outlining Utah law as an example of the formal 
approach). 
 98. Rose, supra note 8, at 848. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 849. 
 101. Id. at 842. 
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plan because the reasonably debatable standard does not allow courts 
to carefully examine compliance with a comprehensive plan. 
However, even the Fasano rule, which changes only certain zoning 
amendments based on their size and scope, leaves many land use 
decisions under the reasonably debatable standard of review and 
thus, to some degree, still deemphasizes the importance of the 
comprehensive plan in those decisions. 
III. DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING THE LEGISLATIVE/ADJUDICATIVE 
DISTINCTION CASE STUDY: UTAH LAW 
Utah law is illustrative of the problems the distinction between 
legislative and adjudicative land use decisions create for judicial 
review. Utah courts have adopted the formal approach, but they, like 
some other jurisdictions, have also applied functionalist doctrines at 
times, which has led to mixed and confusing results. 
A. Utah’s Formal Approach 
Traditionally, Utah has applied a formal legislative/adjudicative 
dichotomy to determine the proper standard of review in land use 
cases. Such a dichotomy avoided analyzing the results of local land 
use decisions and focused solely on the nature of the decision-
making body and the decision-making proceedings. 
In early land use litigation, Utah, like most courts at the time, 
recognized original zoning acts and zoning amendments as 
legislative and applied the traditional “fairly debatable” standard to 
legislative decisions on review. In Marshall v. Salt Lake City, citizens 
challenged the city’s original zoning ordinance that divided the city 
into districts and only allowed specific uses in each district.102 The 
court adopted the standard of review for legislative actions, declaring 
that the zoning ordinance could be upheld “if it is reasonably 
debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare.”103 Utah 
courts continued this trend in later decisions that reviewed zoning 
amendments. For example, in both Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp.104 
and Gayland v. Salt Lake County,105 the Utah Supreme Court 
 102. 141 P.2d 704, 705–06 (Utah 1943). 
 103. Id. at 709. 
 104. 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953). 
 105. 358 P.2d 633 (Utah 1961). 
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analyzed local legislative bodies’106 refusal to amend the zoning 
ordinance to change certain parcels of land from residential use to 
commercial use at the request of developers.107 The court declared 
that the rezoning involved was a legislative action that was 
“endowed with a presumption of validity”108 and only required a 
“reasonable basis”109 for the decision. 
Utah courts have adhered to formal distinctions and classified 
decisions made by administrative bodies as adjudicative. In Xanthos 
v. Board of Adjustment,110 the court declared that when reviewing an 
administrative board’s determination, courts must determine 
“whether there was evidence in the record to support the . . . 
action.”111 This standard has been expanded to apply to city councils 
and legislative bodies when they act in adjudicative roles. In Davis 
County v. Clearfield City,112 the court of appeals reviewed a city 
council’s denial of a conditional use permit and declared that the 
denial could only be upheld if there was a “factual basis in the 
record.”113 Later, when a landowner argued that this case supported 
the contention that the decisions of a local legislative body must 
meet the substantial evidence standard, the same court rejected the 
argument because the case involved a legislative zoning amendment 
while “the Davis County opinion . . . address[ed] the denial of a 
conditional use permit, . . . an administrative proceeding reviewed 
under the substantial evidence standard.”114 
Accordingly, Utah follows a traditional formal approach to 
making the distinction between legislative and adjudicative 
proceedings. The Utah formal approach promotes legislative 
deference over concerns of planning legitimacy.115 Although many 
Utah courts applying the “reasonably debatable” standard have 
 106. Gayland involved a county planning commission, 358 P.2d at 634, while Dowse 
involved a city council, 255 P.2d at 723. 
 107. See Gayland, 358 P.2d at 634–35; Dowse, 255 P.2d at 723–24. 
 108. Gayland, 358 P.2d at 636. 
 109. Dowse, 255 P.2d at 724. 
 110. 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
 111. Id. at 1035. 
 112. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
 113. Id. at 712. 
 114. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 17 P.3d 1160, 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), vacated 
by 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003). 
 115. For a discussion of the general policies behind the formal approach, see Part 
II.B.1.a. 
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noted the comprehensive plan in setting out the controversy before 
the court, they have rarely relied on conformance with the 
comprehensive plan in making their decisions.116 Nevertheless, in 
some cases, the Utah Supreme Court subordinated legislative 
deference to acquiesce to planning concerns.117 The court, however, 
used functional policies in the process muddling the law for 
legislative/adjudicative distinctions. 
B. Muddying the Waters: Referendums and Land Use in Utah 
The Utah Supreme Court has altered its doctrinal course away 
from its formalist underpinnings by adopting a rationale reminiscent 
of functional approach opinions when determining whether or not 
referendums apply to the adoption of zoning amendments.118 The 
Court appears to want to recognize the dangers that public pressure 
creates for local land use without recognizing that such pressure is 
inherent in all land use decisions. 
In Wilson v. Manning, the Fruit Heights City Council adopted 
an amendment to the zoning ordinance that rezoned ten acres of 
land from residential to commercial to allow the construction of a 
shopping center.119 Nearby homeowners submitted “a timely 
referendum petition containing the required number of verified 
signatures, but the City Council refused to allow the petition to be 
submitted to a referendum vote.”120 The Homeowners sought a writ 
 116. See, e.g., Bradley, 70 P.3d at 55 (“It is not up to the court to determine whether 
Payson City made the right decision or the best decision in relying on the General Plan rather 
than the Payson Zone Map.”); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. N. Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559, 562 
(Utah 1967) (giving lip service to the term “comprehensive plan” and then not referring to 
any sort of general or comprehensive plan in making a decision); Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper 
City, 997 P.2d 321, 322–23 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the denial of a zoning change 
that complied with the conceived notions of the city’s general plan was valid under a 
reasonably debatable standard). 
 117. See Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 253–54 (Utah 1982); Bird v. Sorenson, 394 
P.2d 808, 808 (Utah 1964). 
 118. A referendum is a procedural method that grants a veto-like power to the individual 
voters of a state. The Utah Constitution allows “a fraction of the voters of any legal subdivision 
of the state . . . ‘[to] require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of said legal 
subdivision to be submitted to the voters thereof before such law or ordinance shall take 
effect.’” Wilson, 657 P.2d at 251 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1 and citing UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 20-11-21 (1953)). 
 119. Id. at 252. 
 120. Id. 
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of mandamus to compel a referendum vote, which was eventually 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.121 
The supreme court determined that zoning amendments were 
administrative in character and thus not subject to referendum. The 
court noted that precedent limited the referendum process “‘to the 
acts of the governing body performed in the execution of its 
function as a “lawmaking” body.’ That is, the referendum statute 
was meant ‘to apply only to laws, ordinances, resolutions or motions 
which are legislative in character.’”122 The court held that because 
referendums were a legislative power, they did not apply to zoning 
amendments, which were often administrative. In so holding, the 
court appealed to the policy of effective city management and 
planning: “the importance of professional expertise and community-
wide perspective in zoning matters, given effect in common 
requirements for public hearings, planning commission 
recommendations, and the establishment of comprehensive plans, 
weighs against the piecemeal changes that can result from allowing 
voters to veto zoning actions by referenda.”123 The court did 
acknowledge, however, that not all zoning amendments are 
administrative because “[s]ome amendments can constitute such a 
material variation from the basic zoning law of the governmental 
unit as to constitute, in effect, the making of a new law rather than 
merely . . .‘implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it to 
current conditions.’”124 
The reasoning of the court echoes the sentiments expressed by 
proponents of the functional approach.125 The Wilson test for 
determining whether zoning amendments are broad enough to be 
legislative is reminiscent of the results test employed under the 
functional approach because a determination of whether or not a 
zoning amendment is significantly broad to amount to a new law 
rather than a small change must be based on the size and scope of 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (quoting Keigley v. Bench, 89 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1939)). 
 123. Id. The court also noted that “‘[i]f each change in a zoning classification were to be 
submitted to a vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered inoperative.’” Id. at 
254 (quoting Bird v. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808, 808 (Utah 1964)). 
 124. Id. (citing Bird, 394 P.2d at 808). 
 125. See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973); see also supra Part 
II.B.1.b. 
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the amendment rather than the type of decision-making body.126 In 
fact, the only case the court cited in support of its position was a 
Washington case touting the functional approach.127 
The Utah Supreme Court’s sudden concern with compliance 
with a comprehensive plan and implementation of sound planning 
methods marks a departure from the policies underlying formal 
distinctions applied in Utah in all other land use decisions outside of 
referendums.128 While treating referendums and initiatives differently 
is not unique to Utah,129 courts treating them differently have 
adopted a functional approach.130 Utah, however, has attempted to 
recognize the negative consequences that referendums could have on 
the land use planning process while refusing to recognize that the 
same consequences arise in all types of local land use decisions due to 
the significant influence that small groups and public passion can 
have on local legislative bodies.131 
C. Changes in the Statutory Background 
In 1991, the Utah legislature modified the state zoning enabling 
act. The current code follows the SZEA in most regards with two 
significant differences. First, the Utah legislature added a specific 
standard of review provision for appeals. In reviewing land use 
decisions, “[t]he courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and 
 126. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 127. Wilson, 657 P.2d at 254 (citing Leonard v. City of Bothell, 557 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 
1976)). 
 128. See id. at 254–55 (Howe, J., dissenting) (arguing that Bird, 394 P.2d at 808, should 
be overruled “because it is out of harmony with all other Utah cases on the subject, conflicts 
with pertinent statutes and has created an unexplainable dichotomy in our law”). Utah courts 
have also determined that voter initiatives could not be used to make zoning changes. Dewey 
v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 277 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah 1954). The classification of zoning 
amendments as administrative for the purpose of voter initiatives is a departure from those 
states adhering to the formal distinction. See, e.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 
P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980); Merritt v. City of Pleasanton, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001). For further discussion of Utah’s formal approach, see supra Part III.A. 
 129. See Margolis v. Dist. Court of County of Arapahoe, 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 
1981) (declaring zoning amendments legislative as applied to referendums and voter initiatives, 
but quasi-judicial in other contexts). 
 130. See Jafay v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 848 P.2d 892, 897–98 (Colo. 1993) 
(surveying previous law and noting that the distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial 
acts depended upon factors such as the impact of the decision on the public and whether or 
not it only affected a small group of people). 
 131. For a discussion of the types of influences that can sway a local legislative body, see 
infra Part IV.C. 
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regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”132 Interestingly, there is 
no explicit legislative/adjudicative dichotomy for the standard of 
review in the new statutory scheme. Second, the statute does not 
explicitly require that zoning ordinances be in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan. The statute, however, does implicitly require 
compliance with a comprehensive plan. The statute requires each 
municipality to develop a “general plan”133 and then grants 
municipalities official power to “enact a zoning ordinance 
establishing regulations for land use and development that furthers 
the intent of this chapter.”134 Implicitly, if the chapter requires the 
creation of a general plan and zoning regulations must further the 
intent of the chapter, then zoning regulations should conform to the 
general plan. Otherwise, the general plan requirement will not be 
enforced.135 Although Utah courts often refer to the comprehensive 
plan when determining the reasonableness of a decision, it is only 
done in passing and rarely impacts the ruling.136 
D. Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville 
and the Absence of a Legislative/Adjudicative Distinction 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville 
was the first Utah Supreme Court case to interpret the standard of 
review provisions of this amended statute.137 In Springville Citizens, 
the court failed to note how this new statutory standard of review 
affected the traditional legislative/adjudicative dichotomy. 
In 1999, a Springville City resident appealed a challenge to the 
city’s approval of a PUD to the Utah Supreme Court. The court did 
not analyze whether approval of a PUD via a zoning amendment was 
a legislative or adjudicative action;138 however, the court 
unequivocally explained that a PUD was subject to a “substantial 
evidence” standard of review, the standard generally required for 
adjudicative proceedings.139 
 132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001(3) (2003). 
 133. Id. § 10-9-301. 
 134. Id. § 10-9-401. 
 135. For more on this argument, see infra Part IV.B. 
 136. See supra note 116. 
 137. 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). 
 138. Id. at 336–37. 
 139. Id. at 336. 
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The Springville City zoning ordinance contained a floating zone 
that designated several regions in which the city would allow a PUD. 
After the city council approved a PUD, the council was required to 
pass an ordinance “amend[ing] the City’s zoning map” to account 
for the location of the PUD.140 The PUD approval process required 
“applicants to submit numerous documents” for the city planning 
commission and the city council to review before making an initial 
approval of the PUD plans subject to the petitioner/developer 
meeting additional requirements and conditions for final approval.141 
In the case of Springville Citizens, the city failed to follow the 
procedure outlined in the city ordinance.142 Plaintiffs challenged the 
decision to approve the PUD plan under two statutory theories: first, 
that the decision was “arbitrary and capricious”—the new statutory 
standard143—and second, that the decision was illegal.144 The case 
turned on the fact that the city failed to follow its own ordinance and 
was thus illegal. 
Even though the court could have rested on the illegality issue, it 
decided also to dedicate some analysis to the first issue—whether the 
city’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained the 
arbitrary and capricious standard as follows: 
A municipality’s land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is 
not supported by substantial evidence. In evaluating the City’s 
decision under this standard, we review the evidence in the record 
to ensure that the City proceeded within the limits of fairness and 
acted in good faith. We also determine whether, in light of the 
evidence before the City, a reasonable mind could reach the same 
 140. Id. at 334. Although the Springville City statute does not label its ordinance this 
way, the method is basically the same as the floating zone method. See 2 YOUNG, supra note 
26, §§ 11.15–.17. The other commonly used method involves using a special permit or 
exception, see id. § 11.18, which is generally considered administrative because it does not 
amend the zoning ordinance but grants an exception to the zoning ordinance based on a list of 
factors. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 141. Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d at 333. 
 142. Id. at 335. Specifically, the city council failed to have the location and use of 
irrigation ditches certified, the planning commission failed to make a specific recommendation 
regarding the ordinance, and the city council failed to submit suggested modifications to the 
planning commission. Id. 
 143. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001(3)(b) (2002). 
 144. Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d at 336. 
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conclusion as the City. We do not, however, weigh the evidence 
anew or substitute our judgment for that of the municipality.145 
As noted above, Utah courts had developed different standards 
for legislative and adjudicative local land use decisions.146 Strangely, 
in applying the substantial evidence standard, the court never 
addressed whether the proceeding was legislative or adjudicative. 
Instead, the court, in applying the substantial evidence standard, 
apparently presumed the approval of a PUD to be an administrative 
proceeding, a presumption that is hardly self-evident.147 The decision 
being reviewed was the city council’s approval of an amendment to 
the zoning map, not a conditional use permit or variance typical of a 
city council’s adjudicatory responsibilities.148 On the other hand, the 
administrative procedures and required factors described in the 
Springville City ordinance make the process appear to be more 
adjudicative in nature. Thus, because the supreme court did not 
address a seemingly close question of law as to whether or not a 
PUD approval is legislative or adjudicative, the court appeared either 
to have abandoned the formal approach to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction by determining a zoning 
amendment that allows a PUD to be adjudicative, or to have 
 145. Id. at 336–37 (citations omitted). 
 146. See supra Part III.A. 
 147. Although Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 53–54 (Utah 2003), later 
pointed out that the issue was not properly raised and was basically conceded by the parties, 
the fact that a large number of state courts applying the formal approach have declared PUD 
approvals similar to the PUD approval in this case as adjudicative indicates that it was a close 
question of law that will eventually demand the attention of the court. See, e.g., Stokes v. City 
of Mishawaka, 441 N.E.2d 24, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (classifying a city council’s decision to 
approve an application to zone land for PUD as legislative); State ex rel. Helujon, Ltd. v. 
Jefferson County, 964 S.W.2d 531, 535–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that approval of a 
PUD classification is a legislative zoning decision); Todd Mart, Inc. v. Town Bd., 370 
N.Y.S.2d 683, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (noting that “[a] majority of . . . jurisdictions 
[considering this question] hold that the secondary determination, whether to approve a 
particular planned unit development district, is a legislative function exercised by the local 
zoning authority”); Harrison v. City of Kettering, No. 12728, 1991 WL 208408, at * 2, 
(Ohio App. 2d Oct. 8, 1991) (“[A]pproval of a PUD plan is a legislative activity.”) (emphasis 
omitted); Lutz v. City of Longview, 520 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wash. 1974) (stating, in analyzing 
the legal effect of approving a PUD for a certain parcel of land, that “[t]he authorities are clear 
that such a change in permitted uses is a rezone or amendment of the zoning ordinance[;] 
‘[t]he end product is, of course, an amendment to the zoning ordinance which reclassifies the 
land in question’”) (citation omitted). All of these cases were cited by the dissent in Harmon 
City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321, 334 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 148. See supra Part III.A. 
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abandoned the legislative distinction altogether in favor of a single 
standard of review. 
E. The Debate in the Court of Appeals over the Meaning of  
Springville Citizens: Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City  
and Bradley v. Payson City Corp. 
The supreme court’s failure to properly address the nature of 
PUD review spurred a lively debate within the Utah Court of 
Appeals concerning the legislative/adjudicative distinction. 
Ultimately, the court of appeals, over strong dissent, created a 
difficult legal formula that appears to blend the formal and functional 
approaches together. 
After the Springville Citizens decision, two cases forced the Utah 
Court of Appeals to deal with the strange absence of a 
legislative/adjudicative distinction in Springville Citizens: Bradley v. 
Payson City Corporation149 and Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City.150 
Both cases dealt with the denial of small zoning amendments, and 
both proponents of the zoning amendments alleged that the court 
improperly used the reasonably debatable standard of review.151 In 
both cases, the Utah Court of Appeals offered essentially the same 
analysis.152 
In Harmon City, the court of appeals reviewed Utah’s law 
outlining the state’s adherence to the formal approach to 
legislative/adjudicative distinctions and held that the new statutory 
language did not eliminate that dichotomy.153 Specifically, the court 
declared that the current Utah statute, which simply states all land 
use decisions have a “presumption of validity” unless they are 
“arbitrary and capricious,”154 did not change the judicially developed 
legislative/adjudicative distinction.155 The court echoed the 
separation of powers doctrine when it explained that “the distinction 
 149. 17 P.3d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), vacated, 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003). 
 150. 997 P.2d 321 (Utah 2000). 
 151. Bradley, 17 P.3d at 1165; Harmon City, 997 P.2d at 323. 
 152. In fact, Bradley essentially adopted the analysis of Harmon City. Bradley, 17 P.3d at 
1165 (noting that the court of appeals is “not at liberty to overrule [its] prior holding”) 
(citation omitted). This Comment focuses mostly on Harmon City because the case provides a 
more thorough legal analysis. 
 153. See supra Part III.A. 
 154. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001(3) (2003); see supra Part III.C. 
 155. Harmon City, 997 P.2d at 324–26. 
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between a municipality’s legislative and administrative functions rests 
on an important principle: it is a legislative body’s prerogative to 
determine public policy, a judicial body’s job to interpret the policy, 
and an administrative body’s job to enforce the policy.”156 The court 
then fell back on Utah’s formal roots when it said, “[e]stablishing 
zoning classifications reflects a legislative policy decision with which 
courts will not interfere except in the most extreme cases.”157 
The court attempted to distinguish Springville Citizens by 
declaring that the local land use decision at issue in that case was 
adjudicative rather than legislative despite the fact that it involved an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance. The court first claimed that in 
making such a broad declaration regarding the substantial evidence 
standard of review for a PUD zoning amendment, the Springville 
Citizens court could not have intended “to abandon [previous] case 
law.”158 To support this claim, the court noted that in Springville 
Citizens “the discretion of the city council and planning commission 
[was limited] by requiring them to consider evidence in particular 
documents when they made their respective decisions.”159 The 
Harmon City court also believed that the PUD approval at issue in 
Springville Citizens was not a zoning amendment. Referring to an 
obscure reference made by the district court, the court argued that 
the area was zoned previously to allow PUDs.160 However, the 
procedure Springville City followed was essentially the application of 
the floating zone approach to the creation of PUDs, which invites 
treatment under the formal approach as a legislative action, not an 
adjudicative action as the court of appeals found.161 
In the Harmon City dissent, Judge Jackson developed an 
argument for a single standard of review and demonstrated several 
weaknesses in the majority opinion. Judge Jackson argued that the 
Utah legislature “enacted a one-size-fits-all standard of review for 
‘municipal[] land use decisions when it passed Section 10-9-1001” 
 156. Id. at 326. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 327. 
 160. Id. at 326 n.11 (noting that the district court in Springville Citizens had mentioned 
that a portion of the tract at issue was zoned so that only PUDs could be placed on the land, 
making it unnecessary for a zoning amendment because no other type of development could 
occur there). 
 161. See supra Part II.A.4. 
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in 1991.162 Section 10-9-1001 of the Utah Code clearly explains: 
“The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and 
regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”163 Judge Jackson further 
contended that Springville Citizens had already interpreted this 
statute as standing for a single standard of review. He explained: 
The supreme court took this broad language at face value in 
Springville Citizens, in not questioning whether the Legislature 
may have intended two different standards of review to arise from 
that single standard. The supreme court did not distinguish 
between city councils’ administrative and legislative functions in 
Springville Citizens. Instead, the court accepted the Legislature’s 
plain language without reservation . . . .164 
Judge Jackson argued that the supreme court made a clear 
interpretation of the new statute that superceded the prior common 
law, and thus it was inappropriate for the court of appeals to consider 
the common law that established two separate standards of review.165 
Judge Jackson also noted problems within the way in which the 
majority distinguished Harmon City from Springville Citizens. Judge 
Jackson argued that the Harmon City majority improperly 
distinguished Springville Citizens on the grounds that the supreme 
court decision was solely a review of procedure. Springville Citizens 
involved two distinct analyses. The Springville Citizens court first 
applied the adjudicative substantial evidence standard when 
determining whether the city council’s approval was arbitrary and 
capricious.166 Then, the court separately examined the procedure 
outlined by the Springville City ordinance to determine whether the 
process was illegal.167 Thus, as Judge Jackson correctly pointed out, 
because Springville Citizens addressed both the procedural illegality 
and the substantive evidence supporting the PUD approval, it was 
inappropriate for the majority to distinguish it on the grounds that it 
dealt exclusively with a procedural question.168 
 162. Harmon City, 997 P.2d at 331 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original). 
 163. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001 (2003). 
 164. Harmon City, 997 P.2d at 331–32 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 332 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 166. Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 336–37 
(Utah 1999). 
 167. Id. at 337–38. 
 168. Harmon City, 997 P.2d at 334 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, the majority’s decision to label a PUD approval as 
an adjudicative action was an incorrect application of Utah law. As 
Judge Jackson argued, most jurisdictions addressing the issue have 
held or implied that a PUD approval was legislative.169 Judge Jackson 
also reasoned that Springville Citizens ruled that PUD approvals 
were legislative by pointing to the fact that the supreme court had 
specifically distinguished final PUD approvals from other 
administrative acts that should have been appealed to the board of 
adjustments.170 Specifically, the court in Springville Citizens reasoned 
“that certain City actions apart from the final [PUD] approval were 
appealable to the board of adjustments . . . .”171 Judge Jackson 
concluded: “Thus, the supreme court [declared] that final PUD 
approval was not an administrative council action appealable to a 
board of adjustment . . . [sanctioning] the district court’s ruling that 
the final PUD approval was legislative.”172 
When the Harmon City majority arguments concerning PUDs 
are viewed side by side with Judge Jackson’s dissent, it is clear that 
the majority employed the functional approach rather than the 
formal approach in determining that the PUD approval was 
adjudicative. The court ignored the label given to the PUD approval 
process by Springville City and determined the nature of the decision 
by the final effect it had. According to Springville Citizens and Judge 
Jackson, the Springville City ordinance clearly contemplates that a 
PUD approval will result in a zoning amendment.173 The majority 
ignored this formal factor and determined that it had the same effect 
as a special use or conditional use permit proceeding.174 
The parties in Harmon City did not appeal the decision of the 
court of appeals, but the issue of the proper standard of review for 
 169. Id. at 332 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing Stokes v. City of Mishawaka, 441 N.E.2d 
24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. Helujon, Ltd. v. Jefferson County, 964 S.W.2d 531, 
535–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)); Todd Mart, Inc. v. Town Bd., 370 N.Y.S.2d 683, 689 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1975); Harrison v. City of Deterring, No. 12728, 1991 WL 208408, at *2, 1991 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4911 (Oct. 8, 1991); Lutz v. City of Longview, 520 P.2d 1374, 1376 
(Wash. 1974)). 
 170. Id. at 333 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Springville Citizens, 979 P.2d at 332). 
 172. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing SPRINGVILLE, UTAH, CODE §§ 11-4-304, -202). 
 174. See id. at 327 n.11. 
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small zoning amendments arose again.175 In Bradley, the same court 
reached the same result and over Judge Jackson’s same dissent.176 
However, this time the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals’ ruling that Springville Citizens 
did not create a single standard of review.177 The court reasoned that 
Springville Citizens did not address the question of the nature of a 
PUD proceeding because both parties stipulated that it was an 
adjudicative proceeding.178 The court also affirmed the lower court’s 
interpretation of the Utah Code and held that the legislature’s 
enactment of section 10-9-1001(3) did not change the traditional 
common-law distinction between adjudicative and legislative action 
by adopting a single arbitrary and capricious standard.179 The court 
then cited language from Springville City’s brief in support of the 
adjudicative classification. Specifically, the court noted that 
Springville City had asserted within its brief “that the challenged 
decision was ‘an administrative one’ that was subject to the 
substantial evidence test.”180 Therefore, the court declared, 
what the Plaintiffs describe as a “sweeping statement” of a new 
“one-size-fits-all” standard of review in Springville Citizens was 
nothing more than a recognition that both parties and the court 
agreed that the challenged action was administrative and should be 
subject to the substantial evidence test. The absence of an 
acknowledgement of the distinction between legislative and 
administrative decisions in Springville Citizens stemmed solely from 
the fact that the standard of review was not a contested issue in that 
case.181 
Because the supreme court in Bradley essentially claimed that 
both parties acceded to the adjudicative nature of the PUD approval 
in Springville Citizens, it refused to address substantively whether a 
city council’s approval of a PUD that results in a zoning amendment 
is legislative or adjudicative in nature. This enabled the court to skirt 
 175. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 17 P.3d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), vacated by 
70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003). 
 176. Id. at 1168. 
 177. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 53 (Utah 2003). 
 178. Id. at 54. 
 179. Id. at 52–53. 
 180. Id. at 54. 
 181. Id. 
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the issue and avoid the conflict that such a ruling would have with 
Utah’s formalist approach to legislative/adjudicative distinctions. 
Even if Bradley’s reading of Springville Citizens is accurate, 
Bradley failed to properly address the issue that was not addressed by 
the Springville Citizens court. Bradley also failed to determine the 
proper method of distinguishing between legislative and adjudicative 
activities in the close cases involving PUDs and other innovative land 
use schemes. Furthermore, the court did not address the policies that 
support a single standard of review. 
Despite the fact that the statute may be interpreted to maintain 
the complex legislative/adjudicative dichotomy, Judge Jackson’s 
dissents identified the real possibility of interpreting the statute in a 
way that facilitates a uniform standard of review. The following Part 
explores the positive effects that such a standard would have not only 
on Utah law but on state law in general and why such a standard is 
preferable to the legislative/adjudicative dichotomy. 
IV. SUPPORT FOR A SINGLE STANDARD: POLICIES NOT 
MENTIONED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF 
APPEALS 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals 
mentioned any of the policy considerations supporting a single 
standard of review for land use decisions. The legislative/adjudicative 
dichotomy in land use decisions has failed leaving courts with either 
unworkable rules on the one hand, or unpredictable results, on the 
other. Neither the formal or functional approaches properly account 
for the policy concerns of legislative deference, planning legitimacy, 
and due process. A single standard of review is a viable alternative to 
the traditional legislative/adjudicative division because it allows for 
proper legislative deference, creates a better atmosphere for local 
governments to engage in meaningful and effective large-scale and 
long-term planning, and properly protects due process. It promotes 
the proper use of a distinct comprehensive plan and illustrates a clear 
understanding of how separation of powers and delegation principles 
apply to local governments. The only decisions made by local 
governments that should be accorded legislative deference in the 
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land use arena are those made to develop a large-scale and long-term 
comprehensive plan.182 
A. The Failures of Formal and Functional Distinctions 
Although formal and functional approaches inherently have 
different application difficulties, neither approach fully accounts for 
the policy concerns of legislative deference, planning legitimacy, and 
due process protection. Both approaches are based on factors that 
become variable and meaningless when considered in relation to the 
policies underlying the legislative/adjudicative distinction183 and 
both have become unpredictable in their application. 
1. The limits of labels: formal approach failures 
The formal approach allows local governments to choose the 
standard by which a local government’s land use decisions will be 
reviewed based on how local ordinances “label” the decisions. This 
can give too much deference to adjudicative decisions and too little 
to certain legislative decisions. As one scholar explained, “The formal 
approach is unsatisfactory because it would allow a legislative body to 
gain additional deference for its administrative decisions simply by 
providing that they be adopted by ordinance.”184 
The application of the formal approach to PUD approvals 
exemplifies this problem. PUD plans can be approved through either 
a floating zone method or special use permit method,185 but both 
methods essentially accomplish the same end result through differing 
labels. However, when applying the formal approach to these 
procedures, one is legislative, while the other is adjudicative. Both 
methods require those interested in developing a PUD to petition 
 182. As used herein, the term “land use decisions” includes all zoning decisions, 
amendments, and special and conditional use permits and excludes the creation and adoption 
of a comprehensive plan. See supra note 11. Thus, suggesting that the line between legislative 
and adjudicative decisions be moved so that it lies between all general land use decisions and 
the comprehensive plan supports the general proposition that there should be no 
legislative/adjudicative distinction for purpose of standard of review in land use decisions. The 
rule resembles a beach at high tide. There is still a line dividing the sea from the land, but no 
longer a line dividing the beach into two. 
 183. These policies include the important balance between legislative deference and 
adjudicative legitimacy and the balance between due process and government efficiency. See 
supra Part II.B. 
 184. Lincoln, supra note 15, at 646. 
 185. See supra Part II.A.4. 
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the planning commission and fulfill certain requirements, including 
submitting plans that address a number of different factors.186 Both 
methods also require that the area previously be zoned for PUDs 
either by creating a floating zone or by allowing a permitted 
exception.187 The only difference between the two methods is that 
under the floating zone method, the legislative body must amend 
the zoning map,188 while a board of adjustments simply grants a 
special use permits as an exception to the zoning map.189 
The application of the formal approach to PUDs in other 
jurisdictions further illustrates the confusion concerning whether 
PUD approvals are legislative or adjudicative.190 The PUD example 
illustrates how easy it is for the factors inherent in the formal 
approach become meaningless in determining whether a local land 
use decision deserves the deference due a truly legislative act. 
2. The impracticalities of the functional approach 
The functional approach also suffers from various flaws.191 The 
problems with this approach include the following: it focuses on the 
end result, it places too much emphasis on the facts of the case, and 
it does not take into account the local government structure or the 
state statutes granting the local government’s authority. 
Focusing on the size of the area and the number of landowners 
affected ignores the larger picture of how and why land use decisions 
are made. For example, the Oregon courts developed a two-prong 
test to determine whether a municipal action is adjudicative. The 
courts consider factors such as “the size of the area affected” and 
“the number of landowners affected.192 These factors are extremely 
fact-specific and can cause courts to get lost in the facts and forget 
the legal doctrines that led to the Fasano rule. As a result, Oregon 
 186. See 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.15–17. 
 187. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 188. See 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.15–17; see also supra Part II.A.4. 
 189. See 2 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 11.19. 
 190. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 191. See, e.g., Scott H. Parker & John E. Schwab, Forecast: Cloudy but Clearing—Land 
Use Remedies in Oregon, 15 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 245, 256 (1978–79). 
 192. Id. 
6PRA-FIN 10/13/2004 7:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2004 
1086 
 
court decisions have become unpredictable and unconcerned with 
the purpose underlying the land use decision.193 
The functional approach “ignores significant and perhaps 
appropriate distinctions between legislative and administrative action 
that may have been established by the constitution, the state 
legislature or within the local framework.”194 For example, “one 
would not term a special act of the legislature [as anything] other 
than legislative simply because it applied to a particular jurisdiction 
or person.”195 Because of the fact that local governing bodies often 
take on the role of legislators, adjudicators, and administrators at 
different times, making a determination about what role they are 
playing based on the number of people affected by the decision is 
not reasonable. Some adjudicative activities affect large amounts of 
people, such as class action suits, while some legislation only affects a 
few, such as laws regulating sexually oriented businesses. Therefore, 
the number of people affected is not a reliable indicator of the 
legislative or adjudicative nature of a land use decision. This conflict 
with the separation of powers doctrine is probably one of the reasons 
few states have adopted the functional approach.196 
B. A Single Standard of Review Promotes Effective Planning and 
Better Utilization of the Comprehensive Plan 
The SZEA requires that zoning laws be “made in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan.”197 Developing a single substantial 
evidence standard of review for all land use decisions, except for 
legislative actions creating a comprehensive plan, places more 
emphasis on the importance of having and using a distinct and 
separate comprehensive plan. This will encourage local governing 
bodies to engage in more carefully organized planning. 
 193. Compare S. of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 569 P.2d 
1063, 1068 (Or. 1977) (declaring a comprehensive plan amendment affecting sixty-five acres 
but only one owner a quasi-judicial decision), with Parelius v. Lake Oswego, 539 P.2d 1123, 
1124 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (declaring a zoning amendment affecting 72.9 acres with 
“numerous” owners a legislative decision). Both of these cases were cited in Parker & Schwab, 
supra note 191, at 257–58. 
 194. Lincoln, supra note 15, at 647. 
 195. Id. at 646–47. 
 196. See supra note 83. 
 197. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 26, § 3. 
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The comprehensive plan has been interpreted three ways for 
judicial review: as the entire zoning scheme, limiting the court’s 
ability to scrutinize the land use decision; as a factor to be weighed 
as part of review; and as a distinct document with which land use 
decisions must comply.198 Because the first two schemes do not allow 
a court to properly scrutinize the municipal decision, the third 
interpretation most effectively promotes meaningful, effective 
planning and prevents the ad hoc and piecemeal planning schemes 
that plague many local zoning decisions.199 Unless municipalities are 
required to create a distinct comprehensive planning document, 
courts have little choice but to uphold a municipal body’s land use 
decisions unless they are not reasonably debatable, which opens the 
door for individual private interests and small factions to control the 
planning process.200 A distinct comprehensive plan provides the 
necessary criteria to enable courts to review land use decisions 
applying a substantial evidence standard. By requiring compliance 
with a designated plan, a court can more properly weigh the effects 
of land use changes. 
C. A Uniform Standard of Review Illustrates a More Correct 
Understanding of the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Principle 
of Delegation at the Local Level 
By drawing the legislative/adjudicative line between the 
comprehensive plan and all other zoning and land use decisions, 
courts would display a proper understanding of separation of powers 
and delegation principles at the local level. Furthermore, this line 
would reflect a better understanding of the differences between 
delegated power and actual legislative power and account for the 
administrative nature of a large portion of local government. 
The principle of delegation embodies the separation of powers 
doctrine that one branch cannot delegate power to another branch 
without creating limiting standards and guidelines to that power.201 
Delegation is important when dealing with the integrated structure 
 198. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 199. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 200. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 201. See Lincoln, supra note 15, at 648 (“[V]alid delegations of power come from 
legislation that directs an administrative body or actor to either act or refrain from acting with 
regard to some issue or policy based on established standards and/or procedures.”). 
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of local governments because of blurred lines between legislative, 
executive, and judicial power.202 In many ways, local governments act 
like federal administrative agencies in that they make, adjudicate, and 
enforce the law. In light of the unique nature of local government, 
the method of distinguishing between legislative and adjudicative 
acts based on whether or not the power was delegated by another 
ordinance (even if that delegation is to and from the same governing 
body) fails to distinguish itself from the formal approach.203 
However, if the delegation test is taken a step further, it may become 
a viable alternative for developing a standard of review for land use 
decisions. 
Nearly all state statutes delegate zoning power to local 
governments and establish specific guidelines and procedures for the 
use of this power. Also, nearly all zoning enabling legislation 
contains provisions creating specific fixed procedures for many types 
of land use decisions including variances, special use permits, and 
zoning amendments.204 Even the original enactment of land use 
restrictions and a zoning map have procedural requirements 
including a public hearing and compliance with a comprehensive or 
general plan.205 If taken to its logical conclusion, the delegation test 
would consider all land use decisions for which the enabling act 
outlines fixed procedures as adjudicative and administrative activity. 
Since all zoning, zoning amendments, special use permits, variances, 
and similar actions contain at least some fixed procedural 
requirements and standards, they would be viewed as adjudicative 
and subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. Under 
this model, the creation of a comprehensive plan would be the only 
action viewed as purely legislative. Consistent with the delegation 
principle, courts can safely draw the line between state authorized 
legislative power and state legislative delegation, that is, between the 
development of a comprehensive plan and the enactment of zoning 
ordinances, zoning amendments, and other decisions in furtherance 
of that plan to determine the standard of review. This idea is 
 202. See Reznik, supra note 16, at 260 (“Local governments do not exhibit, nor must 
they follow, strict notions of separation of powers requiring independent legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches with distinct roles.”). 
 203. See supra Part II.B.1.c. 
 204. See supra Part II.A.2–.3. 
 205. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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grounded in the central policies echoed in the Fasano opinion,206 but 
it creates a test which is much more predictable and easy to apply. 
The administrative nature of municipal government can be 
understood more clearly through a basic understanding of the 
doctrine of separation of powers, checks and balances, and 
Federalism.207 James Madison outlined two factors that allowed 
legislative bodies to avoid unjust decisions. First, legislative bodies of 
a “sufficient size and variety . . . would contain such a variety of 
interests that no one ‘faction’ could tyrannize the others.”208 And 
second, the legislature would “assure[] due consideration of the 
public interest: the clash of multiple interests prevents hasty and ill-
considered decisions and forces the legislators to take the time to 
reflect on the true public welfare.”209 As one scholar explains, this 
need for power to be spread out in large legislative bodies reveals 
problems inherent in local legislative power: 
A legislative body drawn from too small or too homogeneous a 
constituency may be dominated by a single interest or faction. 
Factional domination may take varying forms. One is sheer 
corruption, made possible in smaller representative bodies because 
a limited number of persons have influence which must be bought. 
Another possibility is domination by a few who are perceived by 
others as the powerful. The decisions of these few can affect many 
within the community; others must curry their favor, and even 
larger interests find difficulty in organizing against their “cabals.” 
Finally, and perhaps most feared by Madison, is the factional 
domination created by a popular “passion”—sometimes a sudden 
whim, sometimes a longstanding prejudice—that carries a majority 
before it. Under any of these various forms of factional domination, 
all of which are far more likely to occur in a smaller legislature than 
in a larger one, a dominant group may subject others to sudden 
destruction or to permanent political disability.210 
The nature of local governments makes them much more 
susceptible to all of these problems and warrants treating them more 
 206. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 207. See Rose, supra note 8, at 853–56. 
 208. Id. at 854 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63–65 (James Madison) (J. Cooke 
ed., 1961)). 
 209. Id. at 854–55 (citing HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION 195–96 (1967)). 
 210. Id. at 855 (citations omitted). 
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like administrative bodies because the protections of representative 
government often do not work as well at the local level. Identifying 
all land use decisions as administrative in nature would remedy this 
inadequacy. 
This same scholar, however, argues that the unique nature of 
local government merits checks other than judicial review. For 
example, she suggests that rather than higher court review, local 
government decisions can be checked by the doctrines of “voice” 
and “exit,” or the opportunity to participate in local government 
decisions and the option to leave the area if participation in 
ineffective.211 Local populace has often exercised these two options 
to make government more responsive to their needs and to place a 
check on the power of local government.212 
However, relying on the local populace by itself to check the 
municipal planning process is inadequate. The local populace is often 
shortsighted and fails to understand the consequences of many 
planning decisions.213 Thus, it is still important for the judiciary to 
scrutinize local planning decisions so that proper planning 
techniques can be used and individual interests do not take out slices 
of the public interest pie one sliver at a time.214 
Although a single standard of review requiring proof of 
substantial compliance with a comprehensive plan may appear more 
costly and time consuming for small governments, the future of city 
planning demands that local governing bodies pay careful attention 
to their planning decisions. The extra effort a single standard would 
require will reap rewards in the long run because it will prevent a 
piecemeal approach to planning that would allow private interests 
and factions to influence or to drive land use decisions. Without 
requiring courts to employ substantial evidence of compliance with a 
comprehensive plan as part of meaningful judicial review of land use 
decisions, local planning bodies are too susceptible to the immediate 
influence of private interests, factions, and popular sentiments that 
subordinate the promotion of healthy development and growth, due 
process, and public interest. 
 211. Id. at 883. 
 212. See id. at 883–86 (explaining the historical use of “voice” and “exit” at the local 
level of government). 
 213. This is the reason for the concern many courts have for allowing land use decisions 
to be made by referendum or initiative. See supra Part III.B. 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 100–01. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Courts and even state legislatures need not be afraid of 
expanding the scope of judicial review for land use decisions. While 
local legislative bodies should be able to plot out their own long-
term goals and community needs for land use in comprehensive 
plans, they will often need the scrutiny of the courts to prevent the 
whims, passions, and selfish interests of individual citizens from 
dominating local planning decisions and to protect individual 
citizens from overbearing land controls. Zoning enabling legislation 
should be construed, whenever possible, to allow courts to exercise a 
standard of review that will further protect property rights from 
intrusive government control and insulate government land use 
planning from popular passion. 
Todd W. Prall 
 
 
